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Law, Language, and Communication
INTRODUCTION
Ovid C. Lewis
u HE RUBRIC OF LAW, language, and communication encom-
passes an enormous range of questions. This introduction will
raise several of the underlying questions, but the reader will prob-
ably find it more enticing than fulfilling. Yet this is as it must be,
for each article in the sympos-
ium can only provide more
THE AutHoR: OvID C. LEwis (B.A., questions than answers because
J.D., Rutgers, The State University; Of the very nature of the sub-
LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia University) is
a Professor of Law at Case Western Re- ject matter. When analyzing
serve University. His teaching special- problems of law, language, and
ties include Constitutional Law and Le-
gal Process. behavior, very positive state-
ments are generally a product
of over-simplification. The is-
sues here are extraordinarily complex and largely unanswered. In
one sense, the entire symposium constitutes an introduction, one
which will provide the law-trained with some new insights, a few
answers, and many new questions.
To appreciate the complexity of the topic, one can start with
the question posed by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "[Wlhat is left over if
I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise
my arm?"' If we consider Wittgenstein's question as one involv-
ing the nature of human action, we might respond that the differ-
ence between a bodily movement and a human action is that only
the latter involves meaning. Man, unlike other animals, possesses
the capacity to conceive of the past, present, and future. Actions
have meaning both to those who perform them (act meaning) and
to others who observe the act (action meaning). The differentia
of man is his amazing facility to symbolize and to elaborate a con-
ceptual universe.
Yet any attempt to distinguish the conceptual from the non-
conceptual is only analytical. The non-conceptual is always subordi-
1L. WiTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 161 (1953).
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nate to our conceptual apparatus because it is perceived in a par-
ticular context. What we know through proception of the external
world must filter through the conceptual artifacts that define what
we mean. Linguistic scholars pointed out long ago that language
determines the nature of the reality that one sees, and places enor-
mous limitations on the potential development of a culture. Whorf
noted that Europeans often expressed nonspatial ideas in spatial
models. But Hopi Indians possess no such model and cannot use this
type of conceptualization. Similarly, societies without a sophisti-
cated language of mathematics cannot progress as far down the road
to extinction as our own technological society. It is this notion,
that language patterns limit developmental channels, that is often
identified as the Whorfian hypothesis.2
As an outgrowth of war-related research, modern information
theory was formulated by Claude Shannon in the late 1940's and
demonstrated that entropy could be viewed as a measure of the ab-
sence of information about a system. Shannon's theory was essen-
tially limited to a statistical measure of the degree of freedom we
have in producing messages and was not concerned with the mean-
ing of the messages involved. Nonetheless, this model was accepted
2 See generally B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY (J. Carroll ed.
1956). Benjamin Whorf was naturally influenced by his teacher, Edward Sapir, who
also contended that there is a linguistic determinism that operates on culture:
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world
of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of
the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their
society.... The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent
unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages
are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social
reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not
merely the same world with different labels attached. E. SAPIR, SELECTED
WRITINGS IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY 162 (D. Mandel-
baum ed. 1949).
More recently, William Bright has observed:
Pending the outcome of extensive, strictly controlled, cross-cultural testing
of the Whorfian hypothesis, we may limit our acceptance to the following
modified formulation: "Insofar as languages differ in the ways they encode
objective experience, language users tend to sort out and distinguish experi-
ences differently according to the categories provided by their respective lan-
guages. These cognitions will tend to have certain effects on behavior." U.
Carroll, Linguistic Relativity, Contrastive Linguistics, and Language Learning,
1 INT'L REV. APPLIED LINGUISTICS 1 (1963)].
See also Bright, Language and Culture, 9 INT'L ]ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCi.
18, 22 (1968).
It does appear that the language acquired by a person affects the cognitive apparatus, in
such a way that it is easier to learn material that is structured in a fashion isomorphic
with that language. See Osgood, A Behavioristic Analysis of Perception and Language
as Cognitive Phenomena, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENTIST 186, 191-92 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
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and modified by psychologists who constructed a new psycholinguis-
tic model of man's communication processes.3 Prior to this time,
linguistics had generally focused on language as an abstract system
with little attention directed at the characteristics of the persons
using the language.4 The new approach required the psycholingist
to go beyond even Chomsky's view that the basic unit of study was
the sentence. Now he had to analyze the entire communication
act,5 and this required an interdisciplinary approach, including social,
psychological, and even legal notions.
Suppose that Wittgenstein's hypothetical man raised his hand at
an auction, or to vote. How could this act be explained apart from
the social conventions involved? A vote is something that is cre-
ated by convention, and unlike an arm, does not exist independent
of the complex of institutions and rules that define its meaning.
Along with the development of information theory in the 1940's
and 50's came a number of new disciplines, including cybernetics,
3 See, e.g., Miller & Frick, Statistical Behavioristics and Sequqnces of Responses, 56
PsycHoL. REV. 311 (1949); Miller, Language Engineering, 22 J. OF THE ACOUSTICAL
SOcE=Y OF AmcA 720 (1950); Miller, The Psycholinguists: On the New Scientists
of Language, 23 ENCOUNTER 29 (1964). For an extended discussion, see F. ATrNEAVE,
APPLICATIONS OF INFORmATION THEORY TO PSYCHOLOGY: A SUMmARY OF BASIC
CONCEPTS, METHODS AND RESULTS (1959); PSYCHOLINGUISTICS: A SURVEY OF
THEORY AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS (C. Osgood & T. Sebeok eds. 1965). Although
the psycholinguistic model is selected for discussion, there are other models that are
more well-established among linguists, including: (1) the Trager-Smith-Joos model;
(2) the Tagmemic model; (3) the means-ends model of the Prague School; (4) the trans-
formational generative grammar model originated by Zellig Harris and developed by
Chomsky; (5) the stratification model of Lamb (postulating four strata or levels: se-
mology, lexology, morphology, and phonology); and "(6) the system-structire model
derived from Firth's work.
4 Actually the classical school did treat the structure of language integrally with the
use of language. The classical linguist was also very much concerned with the issue of
whether language was primarily a product of nature (physis) or culture (nomos) and
whether it was regular (analogia) or irregular (anomalia). By the renaissance period,
much of linguistic analysis involved attempts to find a unity in language based on the
biblical account of Babel. In the 18th and 19th centuries, emphasis shifted to refine-
ment of the historical method of analysis. Comparative analysis by Rask and Meiflet,
the comparative grammar of Bopp, the family tree model of relationship of Schleicher,
Herder's thesis, and other developments necessarily involved the relation of syntactics
and semantics to pragmatics. It was in the 20th century, when De Saussure in his Cours
d linguistique gin.rale established the dichotomy between la langue and la parole, that
great emphasis was placed on the syntactic and semantic dimensions. De Saussure con-
tended that la langue was the appropriate subject matter for linguists. Bloomfield and
others in our time have followed De Saussure in this matter.
5 See generally J. SEAL.E, SPEECH ACTS (1969).
6 An extensional orientation is wholly inadequate to deal with meaning. Korzyb-
ski's passion for an extensional orientation, in which all concepts are related to nonverbal
realities, led him to iguore the proception problem as well as the logical priority of in-
tensional orientations for evaluation. How would one ever know whether an extensional
orientation is adequate without first establishing intensional criteria?
19721
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general systems theory, and operations research. The new outlook
that emerged required a broader perspective; traditional concepts
seen through the spectacles of these new disciplines were forced to
change. For example, as Frick observed when commenting on the
impact of the psycholinguistic model: - 'Instead of a stimulus caus-
ing a reaction when the threshold is exceeded, we now think rather
in terms of a signal which may be obscured by noise, providing the
information needed to select a response.' "' Such a model is much
less restrictive than psychological models, such as that proposed by
B. F. Skinner, and is accordingly more appropriate for understand-
ing complex adaptive systems capable of goal-changing feedback
and other forms of behavior not easily accommodated within a
stimulus-response model.
[U]nlike a stimulus, a signal (which should be regarded as the out-
put of a transmitter) . . . implies a set of alternatives and thus
emphasizes the effect on behavior of what might have been as well
as what is immediately present. Furthermore, a signal in this sense
functions purely as the basis for response selection. It can, accord-
ing to the theory, be coded into a variety of physical forms and em-
bedded in a variety of signal sets, without effect on its selective
function.8
The view of man that emerges with the aid of the psycholinguis-
tic model emphasizes his capacity to encode, transmit, receive, pro-
cess, and create information.9 In his interaction with the world,
man proceives his environment and fashions conceptual models that
are more or less adaptive in his struggle to persist.
How the physical laws of thermodynamics apply to man's crea-
tion of symbol worlds is not yet clear, but it is clear that, in the act
7 Quoted in Grossman, The Measure of Discriminability, 7 Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYcHOL 176 (1955).
8 Frick, Information Theory, in 2 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF SCIENC 611, 630
(S. Koch ed. 1959).
9 [1Information in its fuller sense is first and foremost a relation or mapping
between sets of constrained variety contained in behaving systems, such that
the transmission of physical signals of a certain sort (a subset drawn from a
predetermined variety pool according to set constraints - for example, lan-
guage) performs a selective function on the systems' repertoire of tendencies
to act in certain ways. Hence, being relational, the "meaning" or "informa-
tion" carried by the physical signals does not reside in these signals but is a
function of the larger system made up of the states of the sending and receiv-
ing units and their relevant environment. Buckley, Information, Communi-
cation, and Meaning, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENTIST 119, 121 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
For a more detailed analysis, see Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 361 (1970); Lewis, Universal Functiodal Requisites of Society:
The Unending Quest, 3 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 3 (1970).
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of creating the organizational negentropy required for symbol pro-
duction, the individual must expend energy in the cerebration pro-
cess and in the external coding process. This does not mean, how-
ever, that there has occurred some transfer of negentropy from the
mind to the message vehicle, whether it be a page of writing or an
oral statement. In the case of writing, we can consider that the
mental pattern produced by cerebration has acted as a template for
the writing process which has produced a particular organization of
ink on the paper. We have produced merely a template which is
transmuted into information again when read. Thus, negentropy
does not exist apart from a perceiver, and the reader expends mental
energy in reading meaning into the visual organization of the marks
on the page.
Quite clearly, these templates will convey distinctive thoughts
to different readers, and different templates distinctive thoughts to
the same reader. As obvious as this differential phenomenon is,
its implications are profound. First, if some templates convey more
information than others, would it not be true that if all templates
of a particular -type were destroyed that a certain amount of negen-
tropy would also be destroyed? At the least, the organization of
the template is lost, in apparent contradiction of the principle of
conservation of energy. Second, some individuals are dearly supe-
rior to others in their capacity to encode, process, and create infor-
mation. An Einstein could produce templates with far greater in-
formation content than most of us. Does that mean that there is
some kind of phylogenetic as well as ontogenetic negentropic input
into gifted individuals that offsets their disproportionate negentro-
pic output? Third, if we are not bound in producing information
by conservation of energy are we free to make any kind of world
we desire, subject only to the limitations imposed by physical regu-
larities ?
Several fascinating problems arise concerning this last point.
Some contend that our conceptual models are isomorphic with the
physical universe because they are produced by structures underlying
both our minds and the external world.10 In other words, we
"naturally" conceptualize the way the universe operates. In a re-
lated vein, Noam Chomsky contends that the universality of the
syntactical structures of various languages is evidence that there is
an innate neurological mechanism in the mind that generates the
10 See, e.g., INTRODuCTION To STRUCrURALISM (M. Lane ed. 1970).
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structure of language." If this view (the phenomenological view)
is correct, then truly free generation of concepts would require
manipulation of the phylogenetic input. But even given a phe-
nomenalistic stance (holding to the view that the mind is a tabula
rasa), the Whorfian hypothesis might indicate that where we can
go conceptually is constrained by where we are now.
Although the modern information theory model indicates that
we must take into account not only what is but what possibly could
be, how can we pierce the conceptual blinders of our culture and
language? We know that no model constructed by man is entirely
veridical since it never reflects completely all of reality.
We also know that an overlapping of complementary models
can add perspective and that we can generate more refined and
sophisticated models. But will we not always generate our next
model with the preconceptions of the path already taken? When
we evaluate any social system, our evaluation is necessarily encapsu-
lated in our own system perspective. The capacity to formulate
language and other symbol systems entails the capacity - or per-
haps better - the incapacity not to respond to the meaning of the
symbol systems, including metalanguages.
If we are confined by our existing conceptual tools it is just pos-
sible that we are traveling the wrong path. Short of accepting a
teleological notion that man's reason will inexorably guide him to
an ultimate state of perfection, it seems highly unlikely that we are
following the best path among those possible. It has been suggested
that our information-processing cousin, the computer, may help in
surmounting this paradoxical situation and free us from the perspec-
tive of our historical moralities. But it seems unlikely that the com-
puter holds any such promise.' 2-
A slight modification of Wittgenstein's arm-raising example of-
fers a useful vehicle for elaboration of many of the difficulties con-
fronting the psycholinguist. Let us assume that as Wittgenstein's
man raises his arm he states, "I have the right." Consider the com-
11 A good introduction to Chomsky's work appears in J. LYONS, NOAM CHOMSKY
(1970).
This is not to say that there is not great variation in languages. In Turkish we can
state the cause of most wars in the one word: Sevistirilemedikjerinden ("because of their
not having been able to be made mutually to love one another"). In Hawaiian we find
5 vowels and 6 consonants, but in Abkhaz 68 consonants and only 2 vowels. Great
variation in phonemes, morphemes and lexemes may exist without contradicting Chom-
sky's thesis since universality still exists as to the way in which the language is learned.
12 See generally Lewis, Universal Functional Requisites of Society: The Unending
Quest, 3 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1970).
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plexity of the transacting systems involved in determining the mean-
ing of this communication act.
First, the psycholinguist must understand the nature of man as
an information-processing entity.3 This has forced psycholinguists
to deal with man's ability to act as simultaneous transmitter and re-
ceiver of information. It was also necessary to take into account
the limits imposed by his physical nature, such as the capacity to
process, at most, 20 decisions per second. 4 There must be input, but
neither too much nor too little, and it must be organized (negen-
tropic) to maintain a person's mental health.
Furthermore, man's channels of communication are varied and
subtle. Wittgenstein's man is transmitting at the gestural communi-
cation band, as well as by a speech act. Since human communica-
tion is invariably social, the transactions - both past and present,
cultural and ontogenetic - among the communicating systems are
highly relevant. While speaking, an individual conveys all manner
of information about his emotional and physical state, education, at-
titudes, socio-economic class, etc.
The psycholinguist is himself using language (a metalanguage)
to explain another's use of language. If the psycholinguist fails to
distinguish language involved in talking ("I have the right") from
characterization of the talking ("right" is a noun, etc.) and from ex-
planations of the communication act (what we are now about), his
model cannot be accurate.
It is natural to stress the role of language in communication since
it is man's most significant symbol system. Speech is a wonderful
method for communication. It requires no tool, needs no light,
varies in intensity, requires little energy, and goes around objects.' 5
13 See generally I. TRAVERS, MAN'S INFORMATION SYSTEM (1970).
14 This limit may account for the universality of degree of complexity of natural
languages rather than Chomsky's thesis that there is an innate neurological basis.
1 5 Mduch communication occurs without words, involving not only visual-gestural
signs (kinesics), but touch, odor, warmth, and variables as subtle as the austere arrange-
ment of a lawyer's office, the dignity of a courtroom and the barren nature of the inter-
rogation room.
The interrogator should sit fairly close to the subject and between the two there
should be no table, desk, or other piece of furniture. Distance or the presence
of an obstruction of any sort constitutes a serious psychological barrier and
also affords the subject a certain degree of relief and confidence not otherwise
attainable.... As to the psychological validity of the above suggested seating
arrangement, reference may be made to the commonplace but yet meaningful
expressions such as "getting next" to a customer by a salesman. F. INBAU
& J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 14 (1962).
And where language is involved, the breaks in voice, tone, rate of talking, pauses,
and other aspects of paralanguage are of significance.
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Judges, legislators, and lawyers, members of the same speech
community, speak ordinary English. Yet, by virtue of its unique
structure, English is not entirely adequate for their purposes, and so
they create a superposed variation or argot. Although legal terms
often sound like ordinary English, their meaning in the argot of the
law may vary considerably. Law teachers know all too well that
"much of a student's confusion, bewilderment, and frustration arises
because he is not being taught law only - he is being taught a for-
eign language as well."'16
The "language of the law is [thus] a convenient label for a
speech pattern with a separate identity,' '17 - "the customary lan-
guage used by lawyers in those common law jurisdictions where En-
glish is the official language"'1 - although "the language of the law
is not officially English."' 9  It is suggested that the language of the
law involves a peculiar type of directive utterance and is distinguish-
ed from ordinary English in that it is precise, hortatory, impressive,
Language... can be used to communicate almost anything. By comparison,
nonverbal behavior is very limited in range. Usually, [nonverbal behavior]
is used to communicate feelings, likings and preferences, and it customarily
reinforces or contradicts the feelings that are communicated verbally. Less
often, it adds a new dimension of sorts to a verbal message, as when a salesman
describes his product to a client and simultaneously conveys, nonverbally, the
impression that he likes the dient.
A great many forms of nonverbal behavior can communicate feelings:
touching, facial expression, tone of voice, spatial distance from the addressee,
relaxation of posture, rate of speech, number of errors in speech. Some of
these are generally recognized as informative. Untrained adults and children
easily infer that they are liked or disliked from certain facial expressions, from
whether (and how) someone touches them, and from a speaker's tone of
voice. Other behavior, such as posture, has a more subtle effect A listener
may sense how someone feels about him from the way the person sits while
talking to him, but he may have trouble identifying precisely what his im-
pression comes from. Mehrabian, Communication Without Words, PSYCHOL-
OGY TODAY, Sept. 1968, at 53.
See also M. WIENER & A. MEHRABIAN, LANGUAGE WITHIN LANGUAGE: IMMEDIACY,
A CHANNEL IN VERBAL COMMUNICATION (1968); THE COMMUNICATION OF EMO-
TIONAL MEANING (J. Davitz ed. 1964); Wescott, Introducing Coenetics: A Biosocial
Analysis of Communication, 35 AM. SCHOLAR 342 (1966). See generally Allen, The
Dynamics of Interpersonal Communication and the Law, in READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 24 (R. Allen, E. Ferster, & J. Rubin eds. 1968) (reprinted from 3 WASH-
BURN L.J. 135 (1964)).
16 Hager, Let's Simplify Legal Language, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 74, 77 (1960).
Holmes once commented: "I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word
of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted
which could convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law." Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897).
17 D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 3 (1963) [hereafter cited as
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW].
18Id.
19 Id. at 10.
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and durable.20 The difficulty, however, is that the search for pred-
sion may detract from one of the other attributes.
Tradition in certain respects adds predsion to the language.2
Indeed, in some instances the etymology of a legal term is a prere-
quisite to appredating its true significance. But if the reason for
the use of a particular foreign or archaic term in the law is solely an
historical accident, why retain it when ordinary English would
achieve greater understanding? "[T]he language of the law should
not be different without a [valid) reason."'23 Yet, if legal terminol-
ogy is more precise, shorter, more intelligible, or more durable, the
use of legal argot may be justified. Lawyers clearly are conserva-
tive in their use of language. Rather than innovate and discard
worn out terms, such as "malice," "conclusive presumption," "afore-
said," "and/or," "forthwith," "hereafter," "hereby," "herein," etc.,
24
the lawyer retains these instruments of confusion for fear that their
omission will make his language "too plain and simple to be dear
and unambiguous, or so plain and simple as to be devoid of legal
meaning, or both."2 5
"That is the fear," cautions Mellinkoff, "that freezes lawyers and
their language. It is predse now. We are safe with it now. Leave
us alone. Don't change. Here we stay till death or disbarment."26
The language of the law is generally hortatory. This is natural,
considering the normative nature of law.
2 0 See S. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND AcnoN 107-08 (2d ed. 1963).
21 Holmes would find that the language of the law reflects tradition to the extent the
law is a "witness and external deposit of our moral life." Holmes, supra note 16, at
459. This is true of all language which is "a depository of the accumulated body of
experience to which all the former ages have contributed their part and which is the
inheritance of all that is yet to come." Anshen, Foreward to LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY
INTO ITS MEANING AND FuNcrioN xvi (R. Anshen ed. 1957).
2 2 Consider the meaning of the term voir dire.
In Modern French voire means in truth, but without the e, is voir, the mean-
ing is to see. A conclusion from Modern French could be that voir dire...
carry [its] Old French meaning to speak the truth, the same meaning as Old
French voir dit, which ended up in English and Modern French as verdict.
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 101-02 (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at 285 (emphasis added). Holmes was more colorful in his denunciation:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past. Holmes, supra note 16, at 469.
2 4 See LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 305, 306, 310, 312, 313, 315; Chafee, The Disor-
derly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 381, 393 (1941).
25Morton, Challenge Made to Beardsley's Plan for Plain and Simple Legal Syntax,
16 J.S.B. CALIF. 103, 105 (1941).
2 6 LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 295.
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Language is not only descriptive, in the sense of supplying verbal
"maps" of nonverbal "territories." It is also prescriptive or di-
rective in the sense of supplying us with verbal "blueprints" of
nonverbal "territories" which we intend through our own efforts
to bring into being. The language of law is of necessity, there-
fore, to a large degree hortatory. In addition to prescribing cer-
tain forms of behavior it must also create the intent, the resolve,
to follow the prescription. The judge is to a large degree a
preacher. The trial is to a large degree a morality play.21
When we say the language of the law is impressive, we are talk-
ing primarily about its impact on the layman. For when he goes to
court he seeks justice, and it is a function of the language of the law
to provide an impression that justice was indeed meted out. The ef-
fort to impress a client by using legal argot is often absurd, yet it
continues because lawyers believe the practice is profitable.2
Whatever criticism is leveled at the language of the law for its
notoriously imprecise and equivocal terms, 9 it does appear that law-
yers choose their words more carefully than non-lawyers, including
the selection of vague or ambiguous terms which serve a useful
function by virtue of their lack of precision." And so it is that law-
27 Hayakawa, Semantics, Law, and "Priestly-Minded Men", 9 W. RES. L REV. 176,
179 (1958).
28 David Mellinkoff points out that most lawyers are not wont to disappoint their
clients' expectations as to archaic words:
A lawyer may find it difficult to hand an old and profitable will-changer a will
instead of a Last Will and Testament. Or to sell a confirmed landlord on a
lease without a W1itnesseth. Or to convince a businessman ... that his con-
tract doesn't need a said or a herein, a null and void, or even a Whereas. The
client may feel cheated. Or let down .... In such cases, diplomacy is called
for, and small continued doses of word opiate may still be the better part of
valor. LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 448.
2 9 See S. CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS 324 (1938). There is no lack of crit-
icism of the language of the law. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 24; Williams, Language
of the Law, 61 L.Q. REV. 71,179,293, 384 (1945).
Roscoe Pound has suggested that this uncomplimentary image was produced by the
clerical jealousy of the burgeoning legal profession on the part of 12th century priests
and monks, and perpetuated by other professionals jealous of lawyers' prestige. Jerome
Frank concluded that the image was based on a belief that lawyers unduly complicate
the law. Numerous other explanations have been proposed (see E. CHEATHAM, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 117-30 (2d ed. 1955)), but probably the
most reliable and relevant explanation for contemporary discontent with the legal pro-
fession is provided by the Missouri-Bar Prentice-Hall Foundation Motivational Study of
Public Attitudes. That study indicates, inter alia, that: (1) lawyers' clients have a lower
opinion of lawyers than individuals who have never obtained a lawyer's service; (2)
dissatisfied clients complained that their attorneys treated them with indifference and
condescension; and (3) lawyers are failing to educate the public about what is involved
in the practice of law. See The Legal Profession: What Lawyers and Laymen Think
About It, 35 N.Y.S.B.J. 374 (1963). This deplorable state of affairs does not speak
well for the communication skills of lawyers, especially as they are enmeshed in law -
"a profession of words." LANGUAGE OF THE LAW vii.
30 In an important sense legal rules are never clear, and, if a rule had to be clear
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yers tend to develop a special legal style, including such phrases as
"we must assume as proved," "it appears to be without foundation,"
and "we cannot justly doubt."
The purpose of phrases such as these is to make inconspicuous the
difference between the real degree of probability and the value of
the inference drawn. In the place of direct assertion, lawyers' lan-
guage asserts an obligation to believe, and this modifying factor is
afterwards disregarded. Wurzel concludes that lawyers have a dis-
tinctive verbiage which conceals the real nature of their reasoning
process, and "[n]o small part of the training of practical lawyers
consists in becoming accustomed to such forms of expression and
processes of thought."3 '
Given the central role of language in the legal process, why have
law schools and lawyers devoted so little attention to the study of
linguistics ?32 There are at least two reasons that come to mind.
First, lawyers generally operate fairly well without formal train-
ing in linguistics. They are not going to invest extensive time and
effort to acquire the argot and tools of linguistic theory unless they
are persuaded that there is a demonstrable payoff.
Second, many of the recent developments in linguistic theory
have dealt with the deep structure of language and the transforma-
tional rules by which users generate surface structure. Although this
type of theory helps eliminate syntactical ambiguities, as does sym-
bolic logic, it sheds little light on the meaning of vague terms. If
we pursue definitions to the most basic terms we often end up with
a colloquy such as: "What do you mean by the term 'man'?" "A
man is a male human." "What do you mean by male?" "You speak
English, don't you!"
before it could be imposed, society would be impossible. The mechanism ac-
cepts the differences of view and ambiguities of words. It provides for the
participation of the community in resolving the ambiguity by providing a
forum for discussion of policy in the gap of ambiguity. Levi, An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REV. 501 (1948).
3
'J. FRANK, LAw AND TmE MODERN MIND 27-28 (1936). Justice Schaefer of
the Supreme Court of Illinois believes though that "[w]hat is happening is that courts
and lawyers are not stopping with the conceptual phrases. They are digging under them
to see what lies there - to see what results are produced." Schaefer, Foreword to The
Language of Law: A Symposium, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 117 (1958).
32 Jurisprudents in their analysis of law have at times become quite involved in lin-
guistic analysis. The most notable example involved H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller.
See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 607
(1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 630 (1958).
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